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Gerd Gigerenzer’s views on probabilistic reasoning in humans have
come under close scrutiny. Very little attention, however, has been paid
to his evolutionary component of his argument. According to Gigerenzer,
reasoning about probabilities as frequencies is so common today because it
was favored by natural selection in the past. This paper presents a critical
examination of this argument. It will show first, that, pace Gigerenzer,
there are some reasons to believe that using the frequency format was not
more adaptive than using the standard (percentage) format and, second,
that Gigerenzer’s evolutionary argument and his other arguments such as
his historical description of the notion of probability are in tension with
each other.
1 Introduction
Many psychologists and philosophers have discussed various kinds of psychologi-
cal experiments which show that ordinary (or even learned) people often commit
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basic logical or probabilistic fallacies. Some psychologists (e.g., Tversky & Kah-
neman (1982)) have interpreted these results as showing that human thinking
generally does not comply with logical and probabilistic laws and is therefore
irrational. However Gerd Gigerenzer, a German experimental psychologist, ar-
gues that Kahneman and Tversky’s claim is based on a false interpretation of
norms of rationality and probability. Gigerenzer claims that the results are
consistent with the ecological rationality —context-bound inferential and math-
ematical abilities— that human beings have acquired in the course of human
evolution. Gigerenzer and his research group attribute the supposed ’errors’
in question to condition of the experiments which make it difficult for human
beings to exert their intellectual abilities properly — conditions very different
from the sort of environmental context in which those abilities were acquired.
Thus, it is no wonder that the subjects give wrong answers in these experi-
ments; therefore, if an experimenter provides such settings that the subjects
can exercise their intellectual abilities specific to the informational structure of
a particular environment and a particular way of informational representation,
then they can and do make a ‘correct’ answer (i.e., complying with the laws of
logic and probability).
In the case of probability, psychological experiments have shown that the
subject often make mistakes in the Bayesian inference quizzes1 and psycholo-
gists and philosophers have taken this as showing that human beings generally
do not comply with the probabilistic laws in probabilistic reasoning. Put it
another way, when human beings make a probability calculation, they gener-
ally do not do along with the laws of probability such as the Bayes’ theorem.
Gigerenzer is against this interpretation. He argues that the problem lies in the
1The quizzes where subjects are asked to calculate the probability of a hypothesis (H : you
are infected with HIV) given data (D : a test says you are infected with HIV) —P(H |D)—
from other probabilities such as the probability of the hypothesis (P(H )) and that of false
alarm (P(D |∼H ))— see appendices for details.
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way in which probabilities are presented in those quizzes, namely as percent-
ages. He argues further that presenting probabilities in the frequency format is
more appropriate, and facilitates reasoning about those probabilities, because
humans are more capable of reasoning about frequencies and in fact acquired
that ability as an evolutionary adaptation: frequency representation (such as
‘1 out of 5’, in contrast to percentage representation, such as ‘20%’)2 is the in-
formational structure which our intellectual abilities on probability are specific
for and they have information-processing psychological mechanisms specific for
those abilities (for example, Gigerenzer (1991, 1993, 2000b,a), Gigerenzer &
Hoffrage (1995), Hoffrage & Gigerenzer (1998)3). Therefore, if the probability
quizzes such as the Bayesian inference quizzes are asked in the frequency format,
then the subjects are better at them than in the percentage format. Gigeren-
zer’s hypothesis about probabilistic reasoning has caused much controversy in
recent years. But few people have examined his evolutionary argument : having
a probability-reasoning mechanism specific for the frequency representation is
common among human beings today because it was more adaptive in the course
of evolution than those for the percentage representation and was selected for.
Although the evolutionary appeal of his overall hypothesis is more tentative and
not always mentioned in his papers, Gigerenzer has maintained it for a decade
(Gigerenzer 1993, Hoffrage et al. 2002). Furthermore Cosmides & Tooby (1996),
leading evolutionary psychologists, also provide some support for this hypoth-
esis. Moreover, others consider the evolutionary part of his hypothesis worth
2Gigerenzer distinguishes natural frequencies and relative frequencies. Natural frequencies
come from natural sampling. In natural sampling, one gets a frequency of a particular event-
type from his or her experience (not systematic survey or experiments) and a natural frequency
is the frequency which he or she acquires that way (e.g., ‘5 hunting successes out of 10
attempts’) and conveys information on the numbers of samples. Relative frequencies are
normalized numbers and thereby convey no information on base rates (e.g., ‘success rate in
hunting of 0.2’). Gigerenzer insists that the frequency representation by natural frequency
rather than relative frequencies affects the subjects’ performance. Hereafter, we only refer to
natural frequencies by ‘frequencies.’
3Gigerenzer makes claims on interpretation as well as representation of probability, but
this paper does not discuss it.
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pursuing. For example, Steven Pinker (1997) cites Gigerenzer’s hypothesis and
says “the mind may have evolved to think of probabilities as relative frequencies
in the long run, not as numbers expressing confidence in single event. [. . . ] Our
ancestors’ usable probabilities must have come from their own experience, and
that means they were frequencies [. . . ]” (p. 347)4.
This paper is a critical examination of his evolutionary argument. I shall
argue, first, that, even if Gigerenzer’s responses to the criticisms are right, there
are some reasons to believe that using the frequency format was not more adap-
tive than using the standard format and, second, that Gigerenzer’s evolutionary
argument and his historical description of the notion of probability —the per-
centage representation is a fairly recent development— are in tension with each
other and he does not give any additional argument to ease the tension. In the
next section, I will briefly review the evolutionary argument for the frequency
hypothesis given by Gigerenzer and his followers. In the following section, I will
point out two problems with these arguments. The first problem is that there
are several reasons such as burden on memory to believe that the frequency
format was not more adaptive than what Gigerenzer calls the standard prob-
ability format (i.e., the percentage representation). Second, the evolutionary
arguments conflict with Gigerenzer’s interpretation of the history of probability
and his account of computational simplicity in the frequency format. More-
over, I also argue that Gigerenzer’s hypothesis is in a less favorable position in
this respect than the other hypothesis of evolutionary psychology, that is, the
cheater-detection hypothesis.
4Robert Nozick (1993) cites Gigerenzer’s paper as an important result.
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2 Evolutionary arguments
In a number of experiments, Gigerenzer and other researchers showed that sub-
jects are better able to solve certain probability problems, such as the Linda
problem and various Bayesian inference problems (see appendices for details) if
the probabilities involved are expressed as frequencies (e.g., ‘1 out of 5’) rather
than percentages (‘20%’). Gigerenzer argues that humans have built-in abili-
ties (mental algorithms) to solve problems using a frequency representation of
probability while they lack corresponding algorithms for percentages.
Gigerenzer tries to explain this from an evolutionary vantage point. In the
early evolution of humans, reasoning in terms of frequencies was more adaptive
than reasoning in terms of percentages. And thus the ability to reason in terms
of frequencies was selected.
[...I]f evolution has selected some kind of [probabilistic] algorithm
in the mind, then it will be tuned to frequencies as representation
(Gigerenzer 1993, p. 291).
Gigerenzer offers two rationales for his evolutionary argument. First, per-
centages and single-event probabilities “took millennia of literacy and numeracy
to evolve as tools for communication” (op.cit., p.290).
Probabilities and percentages are quite recent forms of representa-
tions of uncertainty. [...] Percentages became common notations
only during the French Revolution (mainly, though, for interest and
taxes rather than for representing uncertainty). (Gigerenzer 2000a,
p. 62)
Second, a frequency representation (like “7 out of 30”) carries more informa-
tion than a percentage (like “13.3 %”), because the former tells us the sample
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size, and thus tells us more about the reliability of a prediction based on this
datum:
[I]n an illiterate world, the input representation would be frequencies
of events, sequentially encoded, such as 3 out of 20 (as opposed to
15 per cent or p = 0.15). [...] Moreover, frequencies such as 3 out of
20 contain more information than percentages such as 15 per cent.
These frequencies contain information about the sample size (here:
20), which allows one to compute the ambiguity or precision of the
estimate. (ibid.)
Leda Cosmides and John Tooby (1996), who followed up Gigerenzer’s study
by doing a series of elaborate experiments, also added two other rationales. First
they pointed out that it is easier to update one’s database by using a frequency
representation. If George the hunter has so far killed 5 game in 20 past hunting
expeditions when he went to the north mountain but fails today, the original
frequency is easily updated to “5 out of 21,” which is by no means easy if you
use percentages.
Second, under the frequency representation it is easier to reconstruct refer-
ence classes to compute another frequency. Suppose George has killed 5 game
in 20 attempts when he has gone to the north mountain. But suppose it turns
out that he has killed 4 games in 10 attempts when he carried a spear, whereas
he got only one kill out of 10 times when he used a club. Reorganization of
statistical information like this seems to be very advantageous for prediction
and only the frequency representation allows it.
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3 Problems with the evolutionary arguments
These evolutionary arguments by Gigerenzer and Cosmides & Tooby may seem
to provide sufficient support for the frequency hypothesis5. However, there are
problems with their arguments. First, analysis of the frequency and percentage
representations seems to show that the frequency representation was not always
more adaptive than the standard probability format in the environment in which
early human beings encountered their statistic and probabilistic tasks (3.1.).
Second, the evolutionary argument and Gigerenzer’s other arguments on the
history of probability and computational simplicity conflict with each other
(3.2. and 3.3.).
3.1 Comparison and burden on memory
In this section, we will see a couple of advantages which the percentage rep-
resentation has over the frequency representation. The first such advantage is
ease of comparison. To use the example of hunters again, suppose that you want
know whether Bob (having 130 successes out of 402 attempts) or George (159
out of 530) is a better hunter. If you only use the frequency representation, how
would you compare them? In some cases, we can easily make comparisons using
the frequency representation; for example, when both of Bob and George have
10 attempts, all you have to do is just to compare the number of successes each
has. But this is not the case all the time. However, with the percentage rep-
resentation (under which Bob’s record is.32 and George’s is.30), it is relatively
easy to make a comparison which we need to answer the question.
Another advantage of the percentage representation is that it places less of
a burden on memory than the frequency representation. As Tooby & Cosmides
say, it is easy under the frequency representation to update the data as we get
5For criticisms, see, for example, Girotto & Gonzalez (2001).
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a new sample, and reorganize the data by changing reference classes. But this
means that you have to memorize a new frequency whenever you get another
sample. This increases the load memory is asked to bear. If Fred, a hunter,
whose record is 5 successes out of 16 attempts, succeeds today, you have to
update two numbers (“6 out of 17”). As long as we use the frequency represen-
tation, we have to do this updating whenever Bob goes out for hunting6. One
may object that even under the percentage representation, you have to memo-
rize the frequency to make a percentage representation. But this does not mean
that one should use always the frequency representation. Taking the hunting
example, maybe one has to memorize frequency of success in only recent 10
hunting attempts to make the percentage representation. Or maybe one memo-
rizes initial ten hunting attempts to make the initial percentage representation
and ignores further attempts (and keep only the percentage in your mind); one
still uses some memory to memorize the frequency, but needs much less memory
than when one keeps all the record in one’s mind. Notice that Gigerenzer only
considers two options: using only the frequency or the percentage representation
and ignores a mixed strategy like the ones I have just suggested.
I do not mean that the percentage representation is generally more adaptive
than the frequency representation. Instead, I argue that the three advantages
which Gigerenzer and Cosmides & Tooby mention (section 2) — showing a
sample size, the ease to update the data, and the possibility of reorganizing
the reference classes— are possible only when one memorizes all the cases. In
other words, those advantages trade off against an increased burden on mem-
ory. So the frequency format for probabilistic reasoning could have as many
adaptive disadvantages as advantages when it is compared to the percentage
6 Sloman & Over (2003) make a similar point: we have to memorize all relevant experiences
in order to keep frequency. But since they do not explicitly compare the frequency and the




3.2 Was selection possible?
The second general problem for Gigerenzer’s account concerns the history of
the notion of probability. He seems to hold at least one time that the notions
of single-case probability and of its percentage representation are a fairly recent
development7. It is not clear whether such claims are historically correct (for a
different view, see Girotto & Gonzalez (2002)). But if they are literally true, it
is puzzling how this supports his evolutionary argument. The reason is that in
order for a trait to be evolutionarily advantageous, there must be some alter-
native trait(s) to be selected against, or some phenotypic (but transmittable)
variation (see, for example, Sober 1984, 2000, Sterelny & Griffith 1999). Thus,
if we see Gigerenzer as claiming that nobody had the percentage representation
in the Pleiocene, then there was no selection of the psychological mechanism
for the frequency representation over the one for the percentage representation.
Thus it is because there was some (developmental or other type of) constraint
on the mode of probability interpretation and representation which prevented
other modes from occurring, not because a particular mode was adaptive, that
we are better at probabilistic reasoning in the frequency representation. When
there is only one trait in a population, there cannot be recent selection. In this
case, Gigerenzer can claim that human beings have the psychological mecha-
nism specific for the frequency representation, but it is not because of selection
but some form of constraint.
But as I have said, this straightforward interpretation may not be the only
interpretation. There are at least two ways to reconcile Gigerenzer’s historical
description and his selection scenario concerning the frequency representation.
One way is something like this: suppose that percentage representation emerged
7He cites Daston (1988), Hacking (1975).
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(as a result of mutation) in the human population from time to time (or only
once), but it was selected against and disappeared in it whenever it emerged
until percentage representation and a theory of single-event probability finally
fixed themselves in human intellectual (nonevolutional) history. This is compat-
ible with the history of probability (as Gigerenzer sees it) and the unfavorable
selection of the percentage mode of representation. But Gigerenzer and others
have not provided any evidence that there were such representations and no-
tions of probability in the evolutionary history of human beings (and as we saw
above, there are reasons to think that the frequency is no more adaptive than
the percentage representation).
Alternately, early human beings might have used only the frequency format,
but some of them might have gotten better at using the frequency format and
those might have been selected. For example, once most human beings might
have used only the last case to make predictions about future events8. But some
human beings might have used the last two or more cases to make a prediction
and have succeeded in terms of survival and reproduction. Then this way of
using the frequency representation was selected over other ways. In this scenario,
the selection was on different ways to use the frequency representation, not the
frequency representation itself. I have two responses: first, again, Gigerenzer
does not offer anything to support this reading. On the contrary, Gigerenzer
contrasts the frequency representation and the percentage representation rather
than different ways of using the frequency representation. Gigerenzer says:
What is the format of the numerical information humans encoun-
tered during their evolution? [. . . P]robabilities and percentages were
not the way organisms encountered information. [. . . ]
I propose that the original format was natural frequencies, acquired
8I am indebted for this interpretation to John Beatty.
10
by natural sampling. (Gigerenzer 1998, p.62, original italics)
Gigerenzer does not say here explicitly that the percentage representation
was selected against. However, it is clear that he pits the frequency representa-
tion and the percentage representation against each other, not various ways of
utilizing the frequency representation. Second, even if it is a possible scenario, it
is not incompatible with my criticism against his evolutionary argument: recall
I argue that it is difficult to provide enough reasons to show that the frequency
representation is more adaptive than the percentage representation. But this in-
terpretation provides only a reason to show that one way of using the frequency
representation is more adaptive than the other. Even under this interpretation,
it may be fineto say that having an ability specific for the frequency representa-
tion was adaptive, but it is only a very loose way of saying. Even if the subjects
are better at handling probabilistic reasoning in the frequency format than the
percentage format, this is not the result of selection for the mechanism as a
whole .
3.3 Computational simplicity and evolutionary advantage
The last problem facing the frequency hypothesis concerns the computational
simplicity of the frequency format. Let us recall the mammography problem (See
Eddy 1982, Gigerenzer & Hoffrage 1995, Gigerenzer 2000c, see also Appendix for
details.). In this problem, subjects are asked to calculate the probability that a
woman has breast cancer (H) given that she has a positive mammography result
(D). In a quiz, base rate (Pr(H)), true positive rate (Pr(D|H)), and false positive









However, according to Gigerenzer, with the frequency representation, “[a]ll
one needs is the number of cases that had both the symptom and the disease
(here, 8) and the number of symptom cases (here, 8+95)” (Gigerenzer 2000a,
p. 98). Therefore, in this case, the Bayesian equation is like this:








From comparing these two equations, Gigerenzer concludes,
Bayesian algorithms are computationally simpler when information
is encoded in a frequency format rather than a standard probability
format. (Gigerenzer & Hoffrage 1995, p. 687), (Gigerenzer 2000a, p.
99)
Gigerenzer also notes that this computational simplicity involves the number
of operations (in the case of frequency representation, we have to do fewer
computations); furthermore, one deals with natural numbers in the second case
but with percentages in the first case (ibid.).
However, if this analysis is right, then it undermines Gigerenzer’s hypothesis
concerning the content-specific psychological mechanism for the frequency rep-
resentation. For the sake of argument, suppose his simplicity analysis is true. It
follows that we do not have to assume the selection of the psychological mech-
anism specific for the frequency representation to explain Gigerenzer’s (and his
followers’) experimental results, because the subjects’ improved performance
under the frequency representation may be only due to the computational sim-
12
plicity. After all, it is by no means surprising that human beings are better at
computing simpler operations. Let me put it another way. Suppose we have
two hypotheses to explain the phenomena:
(H1) Human beings have psychological mechanisms specific for the
frequency representation. [Gigerenzer’s hypothesis]
(H2) Human beings have general abilities for mathematical calcu-
lation and the difference in subjects’ performance comes from how
computationally easy the tasks are.
(H1) is Gigerenzer’s hypothesis, and (H2) is an alternative hypothesis we may
have. We also have one observation (to be explained) and two background
assumptions:
(O1) Subjects solve the quizzes under the frequency representation
more correctly than under the percentage representation. [From the
experiments]
(A1) Under the frequency representation, computational load is
lighter than under the percentage representation. [Gigerenzer’s ar-
gument on the computational simplicity]
(A2) Human beings compute with fewer mistakes computationally
easier tasks than otherwise [A general fact].
Without (A1)-(A2), (H1) seems to explain (O1) better than (H2). But once
we have (A1)-(A2), then (H2) seems to explain (O1) as well. But (H1) onto-
logically postulates one more object than (H2): psychological mechanism for
the frequency representation. Therefore, if (H1) and (H2) explain (O1) equally
well, (H1) is unfavorable in terms of ontological parsimony. Although it is likely
that natural selection works on more general computational abilities, there is
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no need to assume specific selection pressure to the modes of representation in
order to explain the improvement of subjects’ performance as Gigerenzer does.
4 Summary
In this paper, we have examined Gigerenzer’s and his followers’ evolutionary
arguments regarding the human problem solving abilities measured by Bayesian
inference quiz. From a series of experiments in which subjects solve Bayesian
inference quizzes much better under the frequency representation, Gigerenzer,
and Cosmides and Tooby argue that it is because human beings have acquired
the mathematical algorithms specific for the frequency representation as an
adaptation by which they can deal with probability properly and smoothly.
However, it turns out that their rationales for this interpretation are not
convincing enough. Firstly, even if Gigerenzer and Cosmides and Tooby fo-
cus only on the frequency representation, it is still unclear that the frequency
representation is more evolutionarily advantageous than the percentage repre-
sentation. The frequency representation puts more burdens on our memory
and makes comparisons more difficult. Rather, it is more likely that some ad-
vantages of the frequency representation which Gigerenzer points out trade off
disadvantages which this paper shows. Therefore, their points on them are not
sufficient to claim that the frequency representation was more adaptive than
the percentage representation.
Second, if, as Gigerenzer claims, the percentage representation emerged very
recently, then there may have been no natural selection between the percentage
and frequency representations, because there need to be at least two different
traits for selection to work. So far as I know, Gigerenzer does not deny that
this is what he means.
Finally, Gigerenzer himself proposes an explanation of the performance in
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Bayesian Inference which seems to make no appeal to the existence of a specific
adaptation for it. In this explanation the difference of performance between
the frequency and percentage representations are explained by computational
simplicity. It is just because the frequency representation is computationally
simpler that subjects perform better under this representation and it is onto-




A The Bayesian inference quizzes
The Bayesian inference is one of Gigerenzer’s favorite examples. This inference
is used when one calculates the probability of a hypothesis (e.g., that of one’s
having HIV) given certain information (e.g., that one’s HIV test is positive). In
an example of the relationship between breast cancer and mammography test,
a subject is asked to solve a problem like this (Gigerenzer 2000a, p. 97, he says
this is from Eddy (1982)):
The probability of breast cancer is 1% for a woman at age forty who
participates in routine screening.
If a woman has breast cancer, the probability is 80% that she will
get a positive mammogram.
If a woman does not have breast cancer, the probability is 9.6% that
she will also get a positive mammogram.
A woman in this age group had a positive mammogram in a rou-
tine screening. What is the probability that she actually has breast
cancer?
To calculate the probability, subjects can use the following Bayesian equation.
Pr(H|D) = Pr(D|H)Pr(H)
Pr(D|H)Pr(H) + Pr(D|¬H)Pr(¬H)
Where H means a hypothesis (in this case it is “a woman has breast cancer”),
and D means data (“a woman gets a positive result in a mammography test”).
In this case, Pr(H) is 1% (.01), Pr(D|H) is 80% (.80), and Pr(D|¬ H) is 9.6%





that is, only 7.8%. But when Eddy made this experiment on 100 physicians,
the average of 95 physicians’ estimation is about 75% (not 7.5%). When col-
lege students and staff at the Harvard Medical School were subjects on this
and similar experiments, the experimenters get the similar results, i.e., their
average estimations are from 70 to 80%. It seems that this error is caused by
a phenomenon called base rate neglect. In this case, many subjects seem not
to take into account the probability of breast cancer in population (1%) when
they estimate the posterior probability (Pr(H|D)). Thus, many researchers like
Kahneman and Tversky (1972) conclude that what these results show is that
human beings do not always do Bayesian reasoning correctly.
For the solution of the Bayesian inferences, Gigerenzer emphasizes the im-
portance of the way those problems are represented to the subjects. He argues
that those “irrational” results are caused when they are represented in terms of
probability, and when those quizzes are described in terms of frequency, subjects
show remarkable improvement in their performances. Under the frequency rep-
resentation, the same problem of breast cancer (see the previous section) may
be described as follows (Gigerenzer 2000a, p.97):
10 out of every 1,000 women at age forty who participate in routine
screening have breast cancer.
8 out of every 10 women with breast cancer will get a positive mam-
mogram.
95 out of every 990 women without breast cancer will also get a
positive mammogram.
Here is a new representative sample of women at age forty who got
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a positive mammogram in routine screening. How many of these
women do you expect to actually have breast cancer? out of
.
When Gigerenzer and his fellow researchers made this experiment in proba-
bility and frequentist representations, about a half of physicians (11 out of 24
physicians) gave the Bayesian answer under the frequentist representation, while
only two of (other) 24 physicians gave the correct answer under the probability
representation (see Hoffrage & Gigerenzer 1998).
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